Linux-2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!

security/selinux/ss/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the SELinux security server as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+obj-y := ss.o
+
+ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o
+

security/selinux/ss/avtab.c

@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the access vector table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define AVTAB_HASH(keyp) \
+((keyp->target_class + \
+ (keyp->target_type << 2) + \
+ (keyp->source_type << 9)) & \
+ AVTAB_HASH_MASK)
+
+static kmem_cache_t *avtab_node_cachep;
+
+static struct avtab_node*
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
+		  struct avtab_node * prev, struct avtab_node * cur,
+		  struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	struct avtab_node * newnode;
+	newnode = kmem_cache_alloc(avtab_node_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
+	if (newnode == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	memset(newnode, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_node));
+	newnode->key = *key;
+	newnode->datum = *datum;
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
+		h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return newnode;
+}
+
+static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	     cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (datum->specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return -EEXIST;
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+	if(!newnode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
+ * key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
+ * It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
+ */
+struct avtab_node *
+avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab * h, struct avtab_key * key, struct avtab_datum * datum)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	     cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (datum->specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+
+	return newnode;
+}
+
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return &cur->datum;
+
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
+ * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
+ */
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return cur;
+
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!node)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    node->key.target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return cur;
+
+		if (node->key.source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    node->key.target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!h || !h->htable)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
+		}
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	vfree(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+}
+
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	h->htable = vmalloc(sizeof(*(h->htable)) * AVTAB_SIZE);
+	if (!h->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++)
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	h->nel = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+	       "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, AVTAB_SIZE,
+	       max_chain_len);
+}
+
+int avtab_read_item(void *fp, struct avtab_datum *avdatum, struct avtab_key *avkey)
+{
+	u32 buf[7];
+	u32 items, items2;
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(avkey, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
+	memset(avdatum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	items = 0;
+	avkey->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	avkey->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	avkey->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	avdatum->specified = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	if (!(avdatum->specified & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: null entry\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if ((avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AV) &&
+	    (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AV) {
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+			avtab_allowed(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+			avtab_auditdeny(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+			avtab_auditallow(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	} else {
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION)
+			avtab_transition(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_CHANGE)
+			avtab_change(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_MEMBER)
+			avtab_member(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	}
+	if (items != items2) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+		       items2, items);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 config)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum avdatum;
+	u32 buf[1];
+	u32 nel, i;
+
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated table\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (!nel) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: table is empty\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		if (avtab_read_item(fp, &avdatum, &avkey)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = avtab_insert(a, &avkey, &avdatum);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+				printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: out of memory\n");
+			if (rc == -EEXIST)
+				printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+bad:
+	avtab_destroy(a);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void avtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
+					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
+					      0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
+{
+	kmem_cache_destroy (avtab_node_cachep);
+}

security/selinux/ss/avtab.h

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * An access vector table (avtab) is a hash table
+ * of access vectors and transition types indexed
+ * by a type pair and a class.  An access vector
+ * table is used to represent the type enforcement
+ * tables.
+ *
+ *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+
+struct avtab_key {
+	u32 source_type;	/* source type */
+	u32 target_type;	/* target type */
+	u32 target_class;	/* target object class */
+};
+
+struct avtab_datum {
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED     1
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW  2
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY   4
+#define AVTAB_AV         (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 16
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER     32
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE     64
+#define AVTAB_TYPE       (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED    0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+	u32 specified;	/* what fields are specified */
+	u32 data[3];	/* access vectors or types */
+#define avtab_allowed(x) (x)->data[0]
+#define avtab_auditdeny(x) (x)->data[1]
+#define avtab_auditallow(x) (x)->data[2]
+#define avtab_transition(x) (x)->data[0]
+#define avtab_change(x) (x)->data[1]
+#define avtab_member(x) (x)->data[2]
+};
+
+struct avtab_node {
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct avtab {
+	struct avtab_node **htable;
+	u32 nel;	/* number of elements */
+};
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *);
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k, int specified);
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
+
+int avtab_read_item(void *fp, struct avtab_datum *avdatum, struct avtab_key *avkey);
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 config);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key,
+					  struct avtab_datum *datum);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
+
+void avtab_cache_init(void);
+void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
+
+#define AVTAB_HASH_BITS 15
+#define AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define AVTAB_HASH_MASK (AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+
+#define AVTAB_SIZE AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+
+#endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
+

security/selinux/ss/conditional.c

@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+
+/*
+ * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
+ * in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
+ * or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
+ * exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
+ */
+static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+
+	struct cond_expr *cur;
+	int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (cur = expr; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+		switch (cur->expr_type) {
+		case COND_BOOL:
+			if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+				return -1;
+			sp++;
+			s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[cur->bool - 1]->state;
+			break;
+		case COND_NOT:
+			if (sp < 0)
+				return -1;
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case COND_OR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_AND:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_XOR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_EQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		case COND_NEQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
+ * a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
+ * current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
+ * list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
+ * all of the rules are disabled for safety.
+ */
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	int new_state;
+	struct cond_av_list* cur;
+
+	new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, node->expr);
+	if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
+		node->cur_state = new_state;
+		if (new_state == -1)
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+		/* turn the rules on or off */
+		for (cur = node->true_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+			if (new_state <= 0) {
+				cur->node->datum.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			} else {
+				cur->node->datum.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			}
+		}
+
+		for (cur = node->false_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+			/* -1 or 1 */
+			if (new_state) {
+				cur->node->datum.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			} else {
+				cur->node->datum.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+	p->cond_list = NULL;
+	if (avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab))
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cond_av_list_destroy(struct cond_av_list *list)
+{
+	struct cond_av_list *cur, *next;
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) {
+		next = cur->next;
+		/* the avtab_ptr_t node is destroy by the avtab */
+		kfree(cur);
+	}
+}
+
+static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	struct cond_expr *cur_expr, *next_expr;
+
+	for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = next_expr) {
+		next_expr = cur_expr->next;
+		kfree(cur_expr);
+	}
+	cond_av_list_destroy(node->true_list);
+	cond_av_list_destroy(node->false_list);
+	kfree(node);
+}
+
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct cond_node *list)
+{
+	struct cond_node *next, *cur;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) {
+		next = cur->next;
+		cond_node_destroy(cur);
+	}
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	if (p->bool_val_to_struct != NULL)
+		kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+	cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+}
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	if (p->bool_val_to_struct)
+		kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = (struct cond_bool_datum**)
+		kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum*), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	if (key)
+		kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+
+	booldatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->p_bool_val_to_name[booldatum->value - 1] = key;
+	p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value -1] = booldatum;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
+{
+	if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	u32 buf[3], len;
+	int rc;
+
+	booldatum = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!booldatum)
+		return -1;
+	memset(booldatum, 0, sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+		goto err;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto err;
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err;
+	key[len] = 0;
+	if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum))
+		goto err;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list,
+			     struct cond_av_list *other)
+{
+	struct cond_av_list *list, *last = NULL, *cur;
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[1], i, len;
+	u8 found;
+
+	*ret_list = NULL;
+
+	len = 0;
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (len == 0) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (avtab_read_item(fp, &datum, &key))
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
+		 * conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
+		 * cond_te_avtab.
+		 */
+		if (datum.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
+			if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+				printk("security: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.");
+				goto err;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
+			 * the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
+			 * 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
+			 *
+			 * If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
+			 * be any other entries.
+			 */
+			if (other) {
+				node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE);
+				if (node_ptr) {
+					if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+						printk("security: too many conflicting type rules.");
+						goto err;
+					}
+					found = 0;
+					for (cur = other; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+						if (cur->node == node_ptr) {
+							found = 1;
+							break;
+						}
+					}
+					if (!found) {
+						printk("security: conflicting type rules.");
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			} else {
+				if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+					printk("security: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.");
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, &datum);
+		if (!node_ptr) {
+			printk("security: could not insert rule.");
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		list = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!list)
+			goto err;
+		memset(list, 0, sizeof(struct cond_av_list));
+
+		list->node = node_ptr;
+		if (i == 0)
+			*ret_list = list;
+		else
+			last->next = list;
+		last = list;
+
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_av_list_destroy(*ret_list);
+	*ret_list = NULL;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+	if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
+		printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+		printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+{
+	u32 buf[2], len, i;
+	int rc;
+	struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	len = 0;
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* expr */
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		expr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!expr) {
+			goto err;
+		}
+		memset(expr, 0, sizeof(struct cond_expr));
+
+		expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+		if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) {
+			kfree(expr);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (i == 0) {
+			node->expr = expr;
+		} else {
+			last->next = expr;
+		}
+		last = expr;
+	}
+
+	if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL) != 0)
+		goto err;
+	if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list) != 0)
+		goto err;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_node_destroy(node);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct cond_node *node, *last = NULL;
+	u32 buf[1], i, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!node)
+			goto err;
+		memset(node, 0, sizeof(struct cond_node));
+
+		if (cond_read_node(p, node, fp) != 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (i == 0) {
+			p->cond_list = node;
+		} else {
+			last->next = node;
+		}
+		last = node;
+	}
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
+ * av table, and if so, add them to the result
+ */
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+
+	if(!ctab || !key || !avd)
+		return;
+
+	for(node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key, AVTAB_AV); node != NULL;
+				node = avtab_search_node_next(node, AVTAB_AV)) {
+		if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		     (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->allowed |= avtab_allowed(&node->datum);
+		if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		     (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
+			 * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
+			 * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
+			 * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
+			 */
+			avd->auditdeny &= avtab_auditdeny(&node->datum);
+		if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		     (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->auditallow |= avtab_auditallow(&node->datum);
+	}
+	return;
+}

security/selinux/ss/conditional.h

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
+ * in reverse polish notation.
+ */
+struct cond_expr {
+#define COND_BOOL	1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT	2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR		3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND	4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR	5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ		6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ	7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST	8
+	__u32 expr_type;
+	__u32 bool;
+	struct cond_expr *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each cond_node contains a list of rules to be enabled/disabled
+ * depending on the current value of the conditional expression. This
+ * struct is for that list.
+ */
+struct cond_av_list {
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct cond_av_list *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A cond node represents a conditional block in a policy. It
+ * contains a conditional expression, the current state of the expression,
+ * two lists of rules to enable/disable depending on the value of the
+ * expression (the true list corresponds to if and the false list corresponds
+ * to else)..
+ */
+struct cond_node {
+	int cur_state;
+	struct cond_expr *expr;
+	struct cond_av_list *true_list;
+	struct cond_av_list *false_list;
+	struct cond_node *next;
+};
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb* p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb* p);
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb* p);
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
+
+#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */

security/selinux/ss/constraint.h

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in
+ * order for one or more permissions to be granted.
+ * Constraints are used to impose additional restrictions
+ * beyond the type-based rules in `te' or the role-based
+ * transition rules in `rbac'.  Constraints are typically
+ * used to prevent a process from transitioning to a new user
+ * identity or role unless it is in a privileged type.
+ * Constraints are likewise typically used to prevent a
+ * process from labeling an object with a different user
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+struct constraint_expr {
+#define CEXPR_NOT		1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND		2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR		3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR		4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES		5 /* attr op names */
+	u32 expr_type;		/* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER 1		/* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE 2		/* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE 4		/* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET 8		/* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16	/* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2 32		/* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2 64		/* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2 128		/* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2 256		/* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1 512		/* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2 1024		/* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+	u32 attr;		/* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ     1		/* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ    2		/* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM    3		/* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY  4		/* domby  */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5		/* incomp */
+	u32 op;			/* operator */
+
+	struct ebitmap names;	/* names */
+
+	struct constraint_expr *next;   /* next expression */
+};
+
+struct constraint_node {
+	u32 permissions;	/* constrained permissions */
+	struct constraint_expr *expr;	/* constraint on permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *next;	/* next constraint */
+};
+
+#endif	/* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */

security/selinux/ss/context.h

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * A security context is a set of security attributes
+ * associated with each subject and object controlled
+ * by the security policy.  Security contexts are
+  * externally represented as variable-length strings
+ * that can be interpreted by a user or application
+ * with an understanding of the security policy.
+ * Internally, the security server uses a simple
+ * structure.  This structure is private to the
+ * security server and can be changed without affecting
+ * clients of the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * A security context consists of an authenticated user
+ * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
+ */
+struct context {
+	u32 user;
+	u32 role;
+	u32 type;
+	struct mls_range range;
+};
+
+static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat,&c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
+		(c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat,&c2->range.level[1].cat));
+}
+
+static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
+	mls_context_init(c);
+}
+
+static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	dst->user = src->user;
+	dst->role = src->role;
+	dst->type = src->type;
+	return mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+}
+
+static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+	mls_context_destroy(c);
+}
+
+static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+	return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
+		(c1->role == c2->role) &&
+		(c1->type == c2->type) &&
+		mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
+}
+
+#endif	/* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
+

security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+	if (e1->highbit != e2->highbit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+	while (n1 && n2 &&
+	       (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+	       (n1->map == n2->map)) {
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n1 || n2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *new, *prev;
+
+	ebitmap_init(dst);
+	n = src->node;
+	prev = NULL;
+	while (n) {
+		new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!new) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(dst);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+		new->startbit = n->startbit;
+		new->map = n->map;
+		new->next = NULL;
+		if (prev)
+			prev->next = new;
+		else
+			dst->node = new;
+		prev = new;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	dst->highbit = src->highbit;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+	if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+	while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
+		if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
+			n1 = n1->next;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((n1->map & n2->map) != n2->map)
+			return 0;
+
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+	if (e->highbit < bit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
+		if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
+			if (n->map & (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit)))
+				return 1;
+			else
+				return 0;
+		}
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *prev, *new;
+
+	prev = NULL;
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
+		if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
+			if (value) {
+				n->map |= (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+			} else {
+				n->map &= ~(MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+				if (!n->map) {
+					/* drop this node from the bitmap */
+
+					if (!n->next) {
+						/*
+						 * this was the highest map
+						 * within the bitmap
+						 */
+						if (prev)
+							e->highbit = prev->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+						else
+							e->highbit = 0;
+					}
+					if (prev)
+						prev->next = n->next;
+					else
+						e->node = n->next;
+
+					kfree(n);
+				}
+			}
+			return 0;
+		}
+		prev = n;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	if (!value)
+		return 0;
+
+	new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+	new->startbit = bit & ~(MAPSIZE - 1);
+	new->map = (MAPBIT << (bit - new->startbit));
+
+	if (!n)
+		/* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
+		e->highbit = new->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+
+	if (prev) {
+		new->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = new;
+	} else {
+		new->next = e->node;
+		e->node = new;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *temp;
+
+	if (!e)
+		return;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n) {
+		temp = n;
+		n = n->next;
+		kfree(temp);
+	}
+
+	e->highbit = 0;
+	e->node = NULL;
+	return;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *l;
+	u32 buf[3], mapsize, count, i;
+	u64 map;
+
+	ebitmap_init(e);
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	mapsize = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	if (mapsize != MAPSIZE) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+		       "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n", mapsize,
+		       MAPSIZE, e->highbit);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (!e->highbit) {
+		e->node = NULL;
+		goto ok;
+	}
+	if (e->highbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: high bit (%d) is not a "
+		       "multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n", e->highbit, MAPSIZE);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	l = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		n = kmalloc(sizeof(*n), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!n) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		memset(n, 0, sizeof(*n));
+
+		n->startbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		if (n->startbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			       "not a multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n",
+			       n->startbit, MAPSIZE);
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		if (n->startbit > (e->highbit - MAPSIZE)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			       "beyond the end of the bitmap (%Zd)\n",
+			       n->startbit, (e->highbit - MAPSIZE));
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		n->map = le64_to_cpu(map);
+
+		if (!n->map) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: null map in "
+			       "ebitmap (startbit %d)\n", n->startbit);
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		if (l) {
+			if (n->startbit <= l->startbit) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: start "
+				       "bit %d comes after start bit %d\n",
+				       n->startbit, l->startbit);
+				goto bad_free;
+			}
+			l->next = n;
+		} else
+			e->node = n;
+
+		l = n;
+	}
+
+ok:
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad_free:
+	kfree(n);
+bad:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	ebitmap_destroy(e);
+	goto out;
+}

security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an
+ * arbitrary number of bits.  Extensible bitmaps are
+ * used to represent sets of values, such as types,
+ * roles, categories, and classes.
+ *
+ * Each extensible bitmap is implemented as a linked
+ * list of bitmap nodes, where each bitmap node has
+ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
+ * the total bitmap.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+
+#define MAPTYPE u64			/* portion of bitmap in each node */
+#define MAPSIZE (sizeof(MAPTYPE) * 8)	/* number of bits in node bitmap */
+#define MAPBIT  1ULL			/* a bit in the node bitmap */
+
+struct ebitmap_node {
+	u32 startbit;		/* starting position in the total bitmap */
+	MAPTYPE map;		/* this node's portion of the bitmap */
+	struct ebitmap_node *next;
+};
+
+struct ebitmap {
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;	/* first node in the bitmap */
+	u32 highbit;	/* highest position in the total bitmap */
+};
+
+#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
+#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
+
+static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */

security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the hash table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
+                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+                               u32 size)
+{
+	struct hashtab *p;
+	u32 i;
+
+	p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return p;
+
+	memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+	p->size = size;
+	p->nel = 0;
+	p->hash_value = hash_value;
+	p->keycmp = keycmp;
+	p->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(p->htable)) * size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (p->htable == NULL) {
+		kfree(p);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		p->htable[i] = NULL;
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+	prev = NULL;
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0) {
+		prev = cur;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+
+	if (cur && (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) == 0))
+		return -EEXIST;
+
+	newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (newnode == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(newnode, 0, sizeof(*newnode));
+	newnode->key = key;
+	newnode->datum = datum;
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
+		h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur != NULL && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0)
+		cur = cur->next;
+
+	if (cur == NULL || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return cur->datum;
+}
+
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			kfree(temp);
+		}
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	kfree(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+
+	kfree(h);
+}
+
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	int ret;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (slots_used = max_chain_len = i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	info->slots_used = slots_used;
+	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+}

security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between
+ * key values and datum values.  The type of the key values
+ * and the type of the datum values is arbitrary.  The
+ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
+ * provided by the creator of the table.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES	0xffffffff
+
+struct hashtab_node {
+	void *key;
+	void *datum;
+	struct hashtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct hashtab {
+	struct hashtab_node **htable;	/* hash table */
+	u32 size;			/* number of slots in hash table */
+	u32 nel;			/* number of elements in hash table */
+	u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key);
+					/* hash function */
+	int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2);
+					/* key comparison function */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_info {
+	u32 slots_used;
+	u32 max_chain_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new hash table with the specified characteristics.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if insufficent space is available or
+ * the new hash table otherwise.
+ */
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
+                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+                               u32 size);
+
+/*
+ * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on memory allocation error,
+ * -EEXIST if there is already an entry with the same key,
+ * -EINVAL for general errors or
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *k, void *d);
+
+/*
+ * Searches for the entry with the specified key in the hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
+ * the datum of the entry otherwise.
+ */
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *k);
+
+/*
+ * Destroys the specified hash table.
+ */
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
+
+/*
+ * Applies the specified apply function to (key,datum,args)
+ * for each entry in the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * The order in which the function is applied to the entries
+ * is dependent upon the internal structure of the hash table.
+ *
+ * If apply returns a non-zero status, then hashtab_map will cease
+ * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
+ * return to its caller.
+ */
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args);
+
+/* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */

security/selinux/ss/mls.c

@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
+ * security context string representation of `context'.
+ */
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
+{
+	int i, l, len, range;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		range = 0;
+		len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&context->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				if (range) {
+					range++;
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]) + 1;
+				range++;
+			} else {
+				if (range > 1)
+					len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]) + 1;
+				range = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
+		if (range > 1)
+			len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]) + 1;
+
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+			                 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else
+				len++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
+ * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
+ */
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
+                        char **scontext)
+{
+	char *scontextp;
+	int i, l, range, wrote_sep;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	scontextp = *scontext;
+
+	*scontextp = ':';
+	scontextp++;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		range = 0;
+		wrote_sep = 0;
+		strcpy(scontextp,
+		       policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+		scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+		/* categories */
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&context->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				if (range) {
+					range++;
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				if (!wrote_sep) {
+					*scontextp++ = ':';
+					wrote_sep = 1;
+				} else
+					*scontextp++ = ',';
+				strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+				scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+				range++;
+			} else {
+				if (range > 1) {
+					if (range > 2)
+						*scontextp++ = '.';
+					else
+						*scontextp++ = ',';
+
+					strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+					scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+				}
+				range = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
+		if (range > 1) {
+			if (range > 2)
+				*scontextp++ = '.';
+			else
+				*scontextp++ = ',';
+
+			strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+			scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+		}
+
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+			                 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else {
+				*scontextp = '-';
+				scontextp++;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid.  Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	int i, l;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * MLS range validity checks: high must dominate low, low level must
+	 * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check), and high level must
+	 * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check)
+	 */
+	if (!mls_level_dom(&c->range.level[1], &c->range.level[0]))
+		/* High does not dominate low. */
+		return 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		if (!c->range.level[l].sens || c->range.level[l].sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+			return 0;
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
+			p->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+		if (!levdatum)
+			return 0;
+
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&c->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				if (i > p->p_cats.nprim)
+					return 0;
+				if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i - 1))
+					/*
+					 * Category may not be associated with
+					 * sensitivity in low level.
+					 */
+					return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * User must be authorized for the MLS range.
+	 */
+	if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return 0;
+	usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+	if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
+		return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `*scontext'.  Update `*scontext' to
+ * point to the end of the string representation of
+ * the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * This function modifies the string in place, inserting
+ * NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
+ */
+int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+		       char **scontext,
+		       struct context *context)
+{
+
+	char delim;
+	char *scontextp, *p, *rngptr;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
+	int l, rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* No MLS component to the security context. */
+	if (!oldc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Extract low sensitivity. */
+	scontextp = p = *scontext;
+	while (*p && *p != ':' && *p != '-')
+		p++;
+
+	delim = *p;
+	if (delim != 0)
+		*p++ = 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_levels.table, scontextp);
+		if (!levdatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+		if (delim == ':') {
+			/* Extract category set. */
+			while (1) {
+				scontextp = p;
+				while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-')
+					p++;
+				delim = *p;
+				if (delim != 0)
+					*p++ = 0;
+
+				/* Separate into range if exists */
+				if ((rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.')) != NULL) {
+					/* Remove '.' */
+					*rngptr++ = 0;
+				}
+
+				catdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table,
+				                          scontextp);
+				if (!catdatum) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+				                     catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				/* If range, set all categories in range */
+				if (rngptr) {
+					int i;
+
+					rngdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table, rngptr);
+					if (!rngdatum) {
+						rc = -EINVAL;
+						goto out;
+					}
+
+					if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value) {
+						rc = -EINVAL;
+						goto out;
+					}
+
+					for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+						rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+						if (rc)
+							goto out;
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (delim != ',')
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (delim == '-') {
+			/* Extract high sensitivity. */
+			scontextp = p;
+			while (*p && *p != ':')
+				p++;
+
+			delim = *p;
+			if (delim != 0)
+				*p++ = 0;
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (l == 0) {
+		context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+				 &context->range.level[0].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	*scontext = ++p;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst,
+				   struct context *src)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &src->range.level[l].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the effective MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst,
+                                    struct context *src)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &src->range.level[0].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
+                                struct mls_range *range)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range into the  context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &range->level[l].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+                         struct context *usercon)
+{
+	if (selinux_mls_enabled) {
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
+
+		/* Honor the user's default level if we can */
+		if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr)) {
+			*usercon_sen = *user_def;
+		} else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr)) {
+			*usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
+		} else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def)) {
+			*usercon_sen = *user_low;
+		} else
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* Lower the clearance of available contexts
+		   if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
+		   that of the user's default clearance (but
+		   only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
+		   the user's computed sensitivity level) */
+		if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr)) {
+			*usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
+		} else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr)) {
+			*usercon_clr = *user_clr;
+		} else
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp'.
+ */
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+			struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *c)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	struct ebitmap bitmap;
+	int l, i;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
+			oldp->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+		if (!levdatum)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		c->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+		ebitmap_init(&bitmap);
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&c->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				int rc;
+
+				catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
+				         	oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+				if (!catdatum)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+			}
+		}
+		ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
+		c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext,
+		    u16 tclass,
+		    u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS) {
+			struct range_trans *rangetr;
+			/* Look for a range transition rule. */
+			for (rangetr = policydb.range_tr; rangetr;
+			     rangetr = rangetr->next) {
+				if (rangetr->dom == scontext->type &&
+				    rangetr->type == tcontext->type) {
+					/* Set the range from the rule */
+					return mls_range_set(newcontext,
+					                     &rangetr->range);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
+			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+		else
+			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Only polyinstantiate the MLS attributes if
+		   the type is being polyinstantiated */
+		if (newcontext->type != tcontext->type) {
+			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+		} else {
+			/* Use the related object MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, tcontext);
+		}
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+

security/selinux/ss/mls.h

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+
+int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+	               char **scontext,
+		       struct context *context);
+
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+			struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *context);
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext,
+		    u16 tclass,
+		    u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext);
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+                         struct context *usercon);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_MLS_H */
+

security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct mls_level {
+	u32 sens;		/* sensitivity */
+	struct ebitmap cat;	/* category set */
+};
+
+struct mls_range {
+	struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
+};
+
+static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
+	        ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
+	        ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+#define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
+(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
+(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2) \
+(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+ mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+
+#endif	/* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */

security/selinux/ss/policydb.h

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+/*
+ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
+ * configuration data for the security policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "constraint.h"
+
+/*
+ * A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
+ * in the configuration data:  individual permissions,
+ * common prefixes for access vectors, classes,
+ * users, roles, types, sensitivities, categories, etc.
+ */
+
+/* Permission attributes */
+struct perm_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* permission bit + 1 */
+};
+
+/* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
+struct common_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal common value */
+	struct symtab permissions;	/* common permissions */
+};
+
+/* Class attributes */
+struct class_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* class value */
+	char *comkey;			/* common name */
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;	/* common datum */
+	struct symtab permissions;	/* class-specific permission symbol table */
+	struct constraint_node *constraints;	/* constraints on class permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *validatetrans;	/* special transition rules */
+};
+
+/* Role attributes */
+struct role_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal role value */
+	struct ebitmap dominates;	/* set of roles dominated by this role */
+	struct ebitmap types;		/* set of authorized types for role */
+};
+
+struct role_trans {
+	u32 role;		/* current role */
+	u32 type;		/* program executable type */
+	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	struct role_trans *next;
+};
+
+struct role_allow {
+	u32 role;		/* current role */
+	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	struct role_allow *next;
+};
+
+/* Type attributes */
+struct type_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* internal type value */
+	unsigned char primary;	/* primary name? */
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+struct user_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal user value */
+	struct ebitmap roles;		/* set of authorized roles for user */
+	struct mls_range range;		/* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+	struct mls_level dfltlevel;	/* default login MLS level for user */
+};
+
+
+/* Sensitivity attributes */
+struct level_datum {
+	struct mls_level *level;	/* sensitivity and associated categories */
+	unsigned char isalias;	/* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+};
+
+/* Category attributes */
+struct cat_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* internal category bit + 1 */
+	unsigned char isalias;  /* is this category an alias for another? */
+};
+
+struct range_trans {
+	u32 dom;			/* current process domain */
+	u32 type;			/* program executable type */
+	struct mls_range range;		/* new range */
+	struct range_trans *next;
+};
+
+/* Boolean data type */
+struct cond_bool_datum {
+	__u32 value;		/* internal type value */
+	int state;
+};
+
+struct cond_node;
+
+/*
+ * The configuration data includes security contexts for
+ * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
+ * network interfaces, and nodes.  This structure stores the
+ * relevant data for one such entry.  Entries of the same kind
+ * (e.g. all initial SIDs) are linked together into a list.
+ */
+struct ocontext {
+	union {
+		char *name;	/* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+		struct {
+			u8 protocol;
+			u16 low_port;
+			u16 high_port;
+		} port;		/* TCP or UDP port information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr;
+			u32 mask;
+		} node;		/* node information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr[4];
+			u32 mask[4];
+		} node6;        /* IPv6 node information */
+	} u;
+	union {
+		u32 sclass;  /* security class for genfs */
+		u32 behavior;  /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+	} v;
+	struct context context[2];	/* security context(s) */
+	u32 sid[2];	/* SID(s) */
+	struct ocontext *next;
+};
+
+struct genfs {
+	char *fstype;
+	struct ocontext *head;
+	struct genfs *next;
+};
+
+/* symbol table array indices */
+#define SYM_COMMONS 0
+#define SYM_CLASSES 1
+#define SYM_ROLES   2
+#define SYM_TYPES   3
+#define SYM_USERS   4
+#define SYM_BOOLS   5
+#define SYM_LEVELS  6
+#define SYM_CATS    7
+#define SYM_NUM     8
+
+/* object context array indices */
+#define OCON_ISID  0	/* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS    1	/* unlabeled file systems */
+#define OCON_PORT  2	/* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF 3	/* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE  4	/* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE 5	/* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6 6	/* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_NUM   7
+
+/* The policy database */
+struct policydb {
+	/* symbol tables */
+	struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_roles symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
+
+	/* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
+	char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_common_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_class_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_role_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_type_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_user_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bool_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_sens_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cat_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS]
+
+	/* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
+	struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
+	struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+
+	/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_avtab;
+
+	/* role transitions */
+	struct role_trans *role_tr;
+
+	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
+	/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
+	/* linked list indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+	struct cond_node* cond_list;
+
+	/* role allows */
+	struct role_allow *role_allow;
+
+	/* security contexts of initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems,
+	   TCP or UDP port numbers, network interfaces and nodes */
+	struct ocontext *ocontexts[OCON_NUM];
+
+        /* security contexts for files in filesystems that cannot support
+	   a persistent label mapping or use another
+	   fixed labeling behavior. */
+  	struct genfs *genfs;
+
+	/* range transitions */
+	struct range_trans *range_tr;
+
+	unsigned int policyvers;
+};
+
+extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
+extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+#define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
+
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS    1
+
+#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
+
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
+
+struct policy_file {
+	char *data;
+	size_t len;
+};
+
+static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+	if (bytes > fp->len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+	fp->data += bytes;
+	fp->len -= bytes;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif	/* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
+

security/selinux/ss/services.h

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
+#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+extern struct policydb policydb;
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
+

security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c

@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the SID table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH(sid) \
+(sid & SIDTAB_HASH_MASK)
+
+#define INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s) spin_lock_init(&s->lock)
+#define SIDTAB_LOCK(s, x) spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, x)
+#define SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, x) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, x)
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	s->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(s->htable)) * SIDTAB_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!s->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++)
+		s->htable[i] = NULL;
+	s->nel = 0;
+	s->next_sid = 1;
+	s->shutdown = 0;
+	INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+{
+	int hvalue, rc = 0;
+	struct sidtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!s) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+	prev = NULL;
+	cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid) {
+		prev = cur;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+
+	if (cur && sid == cur->sid) {
+		rc = -EEXIST;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (newnode == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	newnode->sid = sid;
+	if (context_cpy(&newnode->context, context)) {
+		kfree(newnode);
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		wmb();
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = s->htable[hvalue];
+		wmb();
+		s->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	s->nel++;
+	if (sid >= s->next_sid)
+		s->next_sid = sid + 1;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+	cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid)
+		cur = cur->next;
+
+	if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid) {
+		/* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */
+		sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+		cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+		while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid)
+			cur = cur->next;
+		if (!cur || sid != cur->sid)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return &cur->context;
+}
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+			     struct context *context,
+			     void *args),
+	       void *args)
+{
+	int i, rc = 0;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!s)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			rc = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
+				int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+					      struct context *context,
+					      void *args),
+				void *args)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	struct sidtab_node *last, *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		last = NULL;
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			ret = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
+			if (ret) {
+				if (last) {
+					last->next = cur->next;
+				} else {
+					s->htable[i] = cur->next;
+				}
+
+				temp = cur;
+				cur = cur->next;
+				context_destroy(&temp->context);
+				kfree(temp);
+				s->nel--;
+			} else {
+				last = cur;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
+						  struct context *context)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context))
+				return cur->sid;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	*out_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+	if (!sid) {
+		SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+		/* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
+		sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+		if (sid)
+			goto unlock_out;
+		/* No SID exists for the context.  Allocate a new one. */
+		if (s->next_sid == UINT_MAX || s->shutdown) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto unlock_out;
+		}
+		sid = s->next_sid++;
+		ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+		if (ret)
+			s->next_sid--;
+unlock_out:
+		SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+	}
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*out_sid = sid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+	       "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE,
+	       max_chain_len);
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			context_destroy(&temp->context);
+			kfree(temp);
+		}
+		s->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	kfree(s->htable);
+	s->htable = NULL;
+	s->nel = 0;
+	s->next_sid = 1;
+}
+
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	SIDTAB_LOCK(src, flags);
+	dst->htable = src->htable;
+	dst->nel = src->nel;
+	dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
+	dst->shutdown = 0;
+	SIDTAB_UNLOCK(src, flags);
+}
+
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+	s->shutdown = 1;
+	SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+}

security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table
+ * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+
+struct sidtab_node {
+	u32 sid;		/* security identifier */
+	struct context context;	/* security context structure */
+	struct sidtab_node *next;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 7
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_MASK (SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+
+#define SIDTAB_SIZE SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+
+struct sidtab {
+	struct sidtab_node **htable;
+	unsigned int nel;	/* number of elements */
+	unsigned int next_sid;	/* next SID to allocate */
+	unsigned char shutdown;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+			     struct context *context,
+			     void *args),
+	       void *args);
+
+void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
+				int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+					      struct context *context,
+					      void *args),
+				void *args);
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  u32 *sid);
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag);
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src);
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
+
+

security/selinux/ss/symtab.c

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the symbol table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "symtab.h"
+
+static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+{
+	char *p, *keyp;
+	unsigned int size;
+	unsigned int val;
+
+	val = 0;
+	keyp = key;
+	size = strlen(keyp);
+	for (p = keyp; (p - keyp) < size; p++)
+		val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8*sizeof(unsigned int)-4))) ^ (*p);
+	return val & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2)
+{
+	char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+
+	keyp1 = key1;
+	keyp2 = key2;
+	return strcmp(keyp1, keyp2);
+}
+
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
+{
+	s->table = hashtab_create(symhash, symcmp, size);
+	if (!s->table)
+		return -1;
+	s->nprim = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+

security/selinux/ss/symtab.h

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol
+ * strings and datum values.  The type of the datum values
+ * is arbitrary.  The symbol table type is implemented
+ * using the hash table type (hashtab).
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct symtab {
+	struct hashtab *table;	/* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+	u32 nprim;		/* number of primary names in table */
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
+
+