powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (64bit)
In order to protect against speculation attacks on indirect branches, the branch predictor is flushed at kernel entry to protect for the following situations: - userspace process attacking another userspace process - userspace process attacking the kernel Basically when the privillege level change (i.e. the kernel is entered), the branch predictor state is flushed. Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Michael Ellerman

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@@ -70,6 +70,13 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV)
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std r15,EX_TLB_R15(r12)
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std r10,EX_TLB_CR(r12)
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#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
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START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
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mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1
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andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR
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beq 1f
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BTB_FLUSH(r10)
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1:
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END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
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std r7,EX_TLB_R7(r12)
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#endif
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TLB_MISS_PROLOG_STATS
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