Merge 5.10.33 into android12-5.10

Changes in 5.10.33
	vhost-vdpa: protect concurrent access to vhost device iotlb
	gpio: omap: Save and restore sysconfig
	KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM reservation for seal/unseal
	vdpa/mlx5: Set err = -ENOMEM in case dma_map_sg_attrs fails
	pinctrl: lewisburg: Update number of pins in community
	block: return -EBUSY when there are open partitions in blkdev_reread_part
	pinctrl: core: Show pin numbers for the controllers with base = 0
	arm64: dts: allwinner: Revert SD card CD GPIO for Pine64-LTS
	bpf: Permits pointers on stack for helper calls
	bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access
	bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper
	bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask
	locking/qrwlock: Fix ordering in queued_write_lock_slowpath()
	perf/x86/intel/uncore: Remove uncore extra PCI dev HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3
	perf/x86/kvm: Fix Broadwell Xeon stepping in isolation_ucodes[]
	perf auxtrace: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
	perf map: Fix error return code in maps__clone()
	HID: google: add don USB id
	HID: alps: fix error return code in alps_input_configured()
	HID cp2112: fix support for multiple gpiochips
	HID: wacom: Assign boolean values to a bool variable
	soc: qcom: geni: shield geni_icc_get() for ACPI boot
	dmaengine: xilinx: dpdma: Fix descriptor issuing on video group
	dmaengine: xilinx: dpdma: Fix race condition in done IRQ
	ARM: dts: Fix swapped mmc order for omap3
	net: geneve: check skb is large enough for IPv4/IPv6 header
	dmaengine: tegra20: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error
	s390/entry: save the caller of psw_idle
	arm64: kprobes: Restore local irqflag if kprobes is cancelled
	xen-netback: Check for hotplug-status existence before watching
	cavium/liquidio: Fix duplicate argument
	kasan: fix hwasan build for gcc
	csky: change a Kconfig symbol name to fix e1000 build error
	ia64: fix discontig.c section mismatches
	ia64: tools: remove duplicate definition of ia64_mf() on ia64
	x86/crash: Fix crash_setup_memmap_entries() out-of-bounds access
	net: hso: fix NULL-deref on disconnect regression
	USB: CDC-ACM: fix poison/unpoison imbalance
	Linux 5.10.33

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I638db3c919ad938eaaaac3d687175252edcd7990

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 10
-SUBLEVEL = 32
+SUBLEVEL = 33
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Dare mighty things
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3.dtsi

@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
 		i2c0 = &i2c1;
 		i2c1 = &i2c2;
 		i2c2 = &i2c3;
+		mmc0 = &mmc1;
+		mmc1 = &mmc2;
+		mmc2 = &mmc3;
 		serial0 = &uart1;
 		serial1 = &uart2;
 		serial2 = &uart3;

arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-pine64-lts.dts

@@ -10,5 +10,5 @@
 };
 
 &mmc0 {
-	cd-gpios = <&pio 5 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; /* PF6 push-push switch */
+	broken-cd;		/* card detect is broken on *some* boards */
 };

arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c

@@ -286,10 +286,12 @@ int __kprobes kprobe_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int fsr)
 		if (!instruction_pointer(regs))
 			BUG();
 
-		if (kcb->kprobe_status == KPROBE_REENTER)
+		if (kcb->kprobe_status == KPROBE_REENTER) {
 			restore_previous_kprobe(kcb);
-		else
+		} else {
+			kprobes_restore_local_irqflag(kcb, regs);
 			reset_current_kprobe();
+		}
 
 		break;
 	case KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE:

arch/csky/Kconfig

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ config FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER
 	int "Maximum zone order"
 	default "11"
 
-config RAM_BASE
+config DRAM_BASE
 	hex "DRAM start addr (the same with memory-section in dts)"
 	default 0x0
 

arch/csky/include/asm/page.h

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 #define SSEG_SIZE	0x20000000
 #define LOWMEM_LIMIT	(SSEG_SIZE * 2)
 
-#define PHYS_OFFSET_OFFSET (CONFIG_RAM_BASE & (SSEG_SIZE - 1))
+#define PHYS_OFFSET_OFFSET (CONFIG_DRAM_BASE & (SSEG_SIZE - 1))
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 

arch/ia64/mm/discontig.c

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int __init build_node_maps(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
  * acpi_boot_init() (which builds the node_to_cpu_mask array) hasn't been
  * called yet.  Note that node 0 will also count all non-existent cpus.
  */
-static int __meminit early_nr_cpus_node(int node)
+static int early_nr_cpus_node(int node)
 {
 	int cpu, n = 0;
 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int __meminit early_nr_cpus_node(int node)
  * compute_pernodesize - compute size of pernode data
  * @node: the node id.
  */
-static unsigned long __meminit compute_pernodesize(int node)
+static unsigned long compute_pernodesize(int node)
 {
 	unsigned long pernodesize = 0, cpus;
 
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static void __init reserve_pernode_space(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static void __meminit scatter_node_data(void)
+static void scatter_node_data(void)
 {
 	pg_data_t **dst;
 	int node;

arch/s390/kernel/entry.S

@@ -994,6 +994,7 @@ ENDPROC(ext_int_handler)
  * Load idle PSW.
  */
 ENTRY(psw_idle)
+	stg	%r14,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r15)
 	stg	%r3,__SF_EMPTY(%r15)
 	larl	%r1,.Lpsw_idle_exit
 	stg	%r1,__SF_EMPTY+8(%r15)

arch/x86/events/intel/core.c

@@ -4387,7 +4387,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_desc isolation_ucodes[] = {
 	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D,		 3, 0x07000009),
 	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D,		 4, 0x0f000009),
 	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D,		 5, 0x0e000002),
-	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,		 2, 0x0b000014),
+	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,		 1, 0x0b000014),
 	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,		 3, 0x00000021),
 	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,		 4, 0x00000000),
 	INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,		 5, 0x00000000),

arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c

@@ -1159,7 +1159,6 @@ enum {
 	SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT0_FILTER,
 	SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT1_FILTER,
 	BDX_PCI_QPI_PORT2_FILTER,
-	HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3,
 };
 
 static int snbep_qpi_hw_config(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *event)
@@ -2816,22 +2815,33 @@ static struct intel_uncore_type *hswep_msr_uncores[] = {
 	NULL,
 };
 
+#define HSWEP_PCU_DID			0x2fc0
+#define HSWEP_PCU_CAPID4_OFFET		0x94
+#define hswep_get_chop(_cap)		(((_cap) >> 6) & 0x3)
+
+static bool hswep_has_limit_sbox(unsigned int device)
+{
+	struct pci_dev *dev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, device, NULL);
+	u32 capid4;
+
+	if (!dev)
+		return false;
+
+	pci_read_config_dword(dev, HSWEP_PCU_CAPID4_OFFET, &capid4);
+	if (!hswep_get_chop(capid4))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 void hswep_uncore_cpu_init(void)
 {
-	int pkg = boot_cpu_data.logical_proc_id;
-
 	if (hswep_uncore_cbox.num_boxes > boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores)
 		hswep_uncore_cbox.num_boxes = boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores;
 
 	/* Detect 6-8 core systems with only two SBOXes */
-	if (uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3]) {
+	if (hswep_has_limit_sbox(HSWEP_PCU_DID))
-		u32 capid4;
-
-		pci_read_config_dword(uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3],
-				      0x94, &capid4);
-		if (((capid4 >> 6) & 0x3) == 0)
 		hswep_uncore_sbox.num_boxes = 2;
-	}
 
 	uncore_msr_uncores = hswep_msr_uncores;
 }
@@ -3094,11 +3104,6 @@ static const struct pci_device_id hswep_uncore_pci_ids[] = {
 		.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
 						   SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT1_FILTER),
 	},
-	{ /* PCU.3 (for Capability registers) */
-		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2fc0),
-		.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
-						   HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3),
-	},
 	{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
 };
 
@@ -3190,27 +3195,18 @@ static struct event_constraint bdx_uncore_pcu_constraints[] = {
 	EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END
 };
 
+#define BDX_PCU_DID			0x6fc0
+
 void bdx_uncore_cpu_init(void)
 {
-	int pkg = topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(boot_cpu_data.phys_proc_id);
-
 	if (bdx_uncore_cbox.num_boxes > boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores)
 		bdx_uncore_cbox.num_boxes = boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores;
 	uncore_msr_uncores = bdx_msr_uncores;
 
-	/* BDX-DE doesn't have SBOX */
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 86) {
-		uncore_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
 	/* Detect systems with no SBOXes */
-	} else if (uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3]) {
+	if ((boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 86) || hswep_has_limit_sbox(BDX_PCU_DID))
-		struct pci_dev *pdev;
+		uncore_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
-		u32 capid4;
 
-		pdev = uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3];
-		pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x94, &capid4);
-		if (((capid4 >> 6) & 0x3) == 0)
-			bdx_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
-	}
 	hswep_uncore_pcu.constraints = bdx_uncore_pcu_constraints;
 }
 
@@ -3431,11 +3427,6 @@ static const struct pci_device_id bdx_uncore_pci_ids[] = {
 		.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
 						   BDX_PCI_QPI_PORT2_FILTER),
 	},
-	{ /* PCU.3 (for Capability registers) */
-		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x6fc0),
-		.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
-						   HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3),
-	},
 	{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
 };
 

arch/x86/kernel/crash.c

@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params)
 	struct crash_memmap_data cmd;
 	struct crash_mem *cmem;
 
-	cmem = vzalloc(sizeof(struct crash_mem));
+	cmem = vzalloc(struct_size(cmem, ranges, 1));
 	if (!cmem)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 

block/ioctl.c

@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ static int blkdev_reread_part(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EACCES;
+	if (bdev->bd_part_count)
+		return -EBUSY;
 
 	/*
 	 * Reopen the device to revalidate the driver state and force a

drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c

@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ static void tegra_dma_issue_pending(struct dma_chan *dc)
 		goto end;
 	}
 	if (!tdc->busy) {
-		err = pm_runtime_get_sync(tdc->tdma->dev);
+		err = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(tdc->tdma->dev);
 		if (err < 0) {
 			dev_err(tdc2dev(tdc), "Failed to enable DMA\n");
 			goto end;
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static void tegra_dma_synchronize(struct dma_chan *dc)
 	struct tegra_dma_channel *tdc = to_tegra_dma_chan(dc);
 	int err;
 
-	err = pm_runtime_get_sync(tdc->tdma->dev);
+	err = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(tdc->tdma->dev);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		dev_err(tdc2dev(tdc), "Failed to synchronize DMA: %d\n", err);
 		return;

drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c

@@ -839,6 +839,7 @@ static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
 	struct xilinx_dpdma_tx_desc *desc;
 	struct virt_dma_desc *vdesc;
 	u32 reg, channels;
+	bool first_frame;
 
 	lockdep_assert_held(&chan->lock);
 
@@ -852,14 +853,6 @@ static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
 		chan->running = true;
 	}
 
-	if (chan->video_group)
-		channels = xilinx_dpdma_chan_video_group_ready(chan);
-	else
-		channels = BIT(chan->id);
-
-	if (!channels)
-		return;
-
 	vdesc = vchan_next_desc(&chan->vchan);
 	if (!vdesc)
 		return;
@@ -884,13 +877,26 @@ static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
 			    FIELD_PREP(XILINX_DPDMA_CH_DESC_START_ADDRE_MASK,
 				       upper_32_bits(sw_desc->dma_addr)));
 
-	if (chan->first_frame)
+	first_frame = chan->first_frame;
+	chan->first_frame = false;
+
+	if (chan->video_group) {
+		channels = xilinx_dpdma_chan_video_group_ready(chan);
+		/*
+		 * Trigger the transfer only when all channels in the group are
+		 * ready.
+		 */
+		if (!channels)
+			return;
+	} else {
+		channels = BIT(chan->id);
+	}
+
+	if (first_frame)
 		reg = XILINX_DPDMA_GBL_TRIG_MASK(channels);
 	else
 		reg = XILINX_DPDMA_GBL_RETRIG_MASK(channels);
 
-	chan->first_frame = false;
-
 	dpdma_write(xdev->reg, XILINX_DPDMA_GBL, reg);
 }
 
@@ -1042,13 +1048,14 @@ static int xilinx_dpdma_chan_stop(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
  */
 static void xilinx_dpdma_chan_done_irq(struct xilinx_dpdma_chan *chan)
 {
-	struct xilinx_dpdma_tx_desc *active = chan->desc.active;
+	struct xilinx_dpdma_tx_desc *active;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->lock, flags);
 
 	xilinx_dpdma_debugfs_desc_done_irq(chan);
 
+	active = chan->desc.active;
 	if (active)
 		vchan_cyclic_callback(&active->vdesc);
 	else

drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #define OMAP4_GPIO_DEBOUNCINGTIME_MASK 0xFF
 
 struct gpio_regs {
+	u32 sysconfig;
 	u32 irqenable1;
 	u32 irqenable2;
 	u32 wake_en;
@@ -1072,6 +1073,7 @@ static void omap_gpio_init_context(struct gpio_bank *p)
 	const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs *regs = p->regs;
 	void __iomem *base = p->base;
 
+	p->context.sysconfig	= readl_relaxed(base + regs->sysconfig);
 	p->context.ctrl		= readl_relaxed(base + regs->ctrl);
 	p->context.oe		= readl_relaxed(base + regs->direction);
 	p->context.wake_en	= readl_relaxed(base + regs->wkup_en);
@@ -1091,6 +1093,7 @@ static void omap_gpio_restore_context(struct gpio_bank *bank)
 	const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs *regs = bank->regs;
 	void __iomem *base = bank->base;
 
+	writel_relaxed(bank->context.sysconfig, base + regs->sysconfig);
 	writel_relaxed(bank->context.wake_en, base + regs->wkup_en);
 	writel_relaxed(bank->context.ctrl, base + regs->ctrl);
 	writel_relaxed(bank->context.leveldetect0, base + regs->leveldetect0);
@@ -1118,6 +1121,10 @@ static void omap_gpio_idle(struct gpio_bank *bank, bool may_lose_context)
 
 	bank->saved_datain = readl_relaxed(base + bank->regs->datain);
 
+	/* Save syconfig, it's runtime value can be different from init value */
+	if (bank->loses_context)
+		bank->context.sysconfig = readl_relaxed(base + bank->regs->sysconfig);
+
 	if (!bank->enabled_non_wakeup_gpios)
 		goto update_gpio_context_count;
 
@@ -1282,6 +1289,7 @@ out_unlock:
 
 static const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs omap2_gpio_regs = {
 	.revision =		OMAP24XX_GPIO_REVISION,
+	.sysconfig =		OMAP24XX_GPIO_SYSCONFIG,
 	.direction =		OMAP24XX_GPIO_OE,
 	.datain =		OMAP24XX_GPIO_DATAIN,
 	.dataout =		OMAP24XX_GPIO_DATAOUT,
@@ -1305,6 +1313,7 @@ static const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs omap2_gpio_regs = {
 
 static const struct omap_gpio_reg_offs omap4_gpio_regs = {
 	.revision =		OMAP4_GPIO_REVISION,
+	.sysconfig =		OMAP4_GPIO_SYSCONFIG,
 	.direction =		OMAP4_GPIO_OE,
 	.datain =		OMAP4_GPIO_DATAIN,
 	.dataout =		OMAP4_GPIO_DATAOUT,

drivers/hid/hid-alps.c

@@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ static int alps_input_configured(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_input *hi)
 
 		if (input_register_device(data->input2)) {
 			input_free_device(input2);
+			ret = -ENOENT;
 			goto exit;
 		}
 	}

drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c

@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ struct cp2112_device {
 	atomic_t read_avail;
 	atomic_t xfer_avail;
 	struct gpio_chip gc;
+	struct irq_chip irq;
 	u8 *in_out_buffer;
 	struct mutex lock;
 
@@ -1175,16 +1176,6 @@ static int cp2112_gpio_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct irq_chip cp2112_gpio_irqchip = {
-	.name = "cp2112-gpio",
-	.irq_startup = cp2112_gpio_irq_startup,
-	.irq_shutdown = cp2112_gpio_irq_shutdown,
-	.irq_ack = cp2112_gpio_irq_ack,
-	.irq_mask = cp2112_gpio_irq_mask,
-	.irq_unmask = cp2112_gpio_irq_unmask,
-	.irq_set_type = cp2112_gpio_irq_type,
-};
-
 static int __maybe_unused cp2112_allocate_irq(struct cp2112_device *dev,
 					      int pin)
 {
@@ -1339,8 +1330,17 @@ static int cp2112_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id)
 	dev->gc.can_sleep		= 1;
 	dev->gc.parent			= &hdev->dev;
 
+	dev->irq.name = "cp2112-gpio";
+	dev->irq.irq_startup = cp2112_gpio_irq_startup;
+	dev->irq.irq_shutdown = cp2112_gpio_irq_shutdown;
+	dev->irq.irq_ack = cp2112_gpio_irq_ack;
+	dev->irq.irq_mask = cp2112_gpio_irq_mask;
+	dev->irq.irq_unmask = cp2112_gpio_irq_unmask;
+	dev->irq.irq_set_type = cp2112_gpio_irq_type;
+	dev->irq.flags = IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND;
+
 	girq = &dev->gc.irq;
-	girq->chip = &cp2112_gpio_irqchip;
+	girq->chip = &dev->irq;
 	/* The event comes from the outside so no parent handler */
 	girq->parent_handler = NULL;
 	girq->num_parents = 0;

drivers/hid/hid-google-hammer.c

@@ -526,6 +526,8 @@ static void hammer_remove(struct hid_device *hdev)
 }
 
 static const struct hid_device_id hammer_devices[] = {
+	{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
+		     USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE, USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_DON) },
 	{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
 		     USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE, USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_HAMMER) },
 	{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,

drivers/hid/hid-ids.h

@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_MASTERBALL	0x503c
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_MAGNEMITE	0x503d
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_MOONBALL	0x5044
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_DON	0x5050
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_GOTOP		0x08f2
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SUPER_Q2		0x007f

drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c

@@ -2533,7 +2533,7 @@ static void wacom_wac_finger_slot(struct wacom_wac *wacom_wac,
 	    !wacom_wac->shared->is_touch_on) {
 		if (!wacom_wac->shared->touch_down)
 			return;
-		prox = 0;
+		prox = false;
 	}
 
 	wacom_wac->hid_data.num_received++;

drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_regs.h

@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
 	   | CN6XXX_INTR_M0UNWI_ERR             \
 	   | CN6XXX_INTR_M1UPB0_ERR             \
 	   | CN6XXX_INTR_M1UPWI_ERR             \
-	   | CN6XXX_INTR_M1UPB0_ERR             \
+	   | CN6XXX_INTR_M1UNB0_ERR             \
 	   | CN6XXX_INTR_M1UNWI_ERR             \
 	   | CN6XXX_INTR_INSTR_DB_OF_ERR        \
 	   | CN6XXX_INTR_SLIST_DB_OF_ERR        \

drivers/net/geneve.c

@@ -890,6 +890,9 @@ static int geneve_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	__be16 sport;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	sport = udp_flow_src_port(geneve->net, skb, 1, USHRT_MAX, true);
 	rt = geneve_get_v4_rt(skb, dev, gs4, &fl4, info,
 			      geneve->cfg.info.key.tp_dst, sport);
@@ -984,6 +987,9 @@ static int geneve6_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	__be16 sport;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	sport = udp_flow_src_port(geneve->net, skb, 1, USHRT_MAX, true);
 	dst = geneve_get_v6_dst(skb, dev, gs6, &fl6, info,
 				geneve->cfg.info.key.tp_dst, sport);

drivers/net/usb/hso.c

@@ -3104,7 +3104,7 @@ static void hso_free_interface(struct usb_interface *interface)
 			cancel_work_sync(&serial_table[i]->async_put_intf);
 			cancel_work_sync(&serial_table[i]->async_get_intf);
 			hso_serial_tty_unregister(serial);
-			kref_put(&serial_table[i]->ref, hso_serial_ref_free);
+			kref_put(&serial->parent->ref, hso_serial_ref_free);
 		}
 	}
 

drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c

@@ -824,11 +824,15 @@ static void connect(struct backend_info *be)
 	xenvif_carrier_on(be->vif);
 
 	unregister_hotplug_status_watch(be);
-	err = xenbus_watch_pathfmt(dev, &be->hotplug_status_watch, NULL,
+	if (xenbus_exists(XBT_NIL, dev->nodename, "hotplug-status")) {
-				   hotplug_status_changed,
+		err = xenbus_watch_pathfmt(dev, &be->hotplug_status_watch,
-				   "%s/%s", dev->nodename, "hotplug-status");
+					   NULL, hotplug_status_changed,
-	if (!err)
+					   "%s/%s", dev->nodename,
+					   "hotplug-status");
+		if (err)
+			goto err;
 		be->have_hotplug_status_watch = 1;
+	}
 
 	netif_tx_wake_all_queues(be->vif->dev);
 

drivers/pinctrl/core.c

@@ -1604,8 +1604,8 @@ static int pinctrl_pins_show(struct seq_file *s, void *what)
 	unsigned i, pin;
 #ifdef CONFIG_GPIOLIB
 	struct pinctrl_gpio_range *range;
-	unsigned int gpio_num;
 	struct gpio_chip *chip;
+	int gpio_num;
 #endif
 
 	seq_printf(s, "registered pins: %d\n", pctldev->desc->npins);
@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ static int pinctrl_pins_show(struct seq_file *s, void *what)
 		seq_printf(s, "pin %d (%s) ", pin, desc->name);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_GPIOLIB
-		gpio_num = 0;
+		gpio_num = -1;
 		list_for_each_entry(range, &pctldev->gpio_ranges, node) {
 			if ((pin >= range->pin_base) &&
 			    (pin < (range->pin_base + range->npins))) {
@@ -1633,10 +1633,12 @@ static int pinctrl_pins_show(struct seq_file *s, void *what)
 				break;
 			}
 		}
+		if (gpio_num >= 0)
 			chip = gpio_to_chip(gpio_num);
-		if (chip && chip->gpiodev && chip->gpiodev->base)
+		else
-			seq_printf(s, "%u:%s ", gpio_num -
+			chip = NULL;
-				chip->gpiodev->base, chip->label);
+		if (chip)
+			seq_printf(s, "%u:%s ", gpio_num - chip->gpiodev->base, chip->label);
 		else
 			seq_puts(s, "0:? ");
 #endif

drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-lewisburg.c

@@ -299,9 +299,9 @@ static const struct pinctrl_pin_desc lbg_pins[] = {
 static const struct intel_community lbg_communities[] = {
 	LBG_COMMUNITY(0, 0, 71),
 	LBG_COMMUNITY(1, 72, 132),
-	LBG_COMMUNITY(3, 133, 144),
+	LBG_COMMUNITY(3, 133, 143),
-	LBG_COMMUNITY(4, 145, 180),
+	LBG_COMMUNITY(4, 144, 178),
-	LBG_COMMUNITY(5, 181, 246),
+	LBG_COMMUNITY(5, 179, 246),
 };
 
 static const struct intel_pinctrl_soc_data lbg_soc_data = {

drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c

@@ -741,6 +741,9 @@ int geni_icc_get(struct geni_se *se, const char *icc_ddr)
 	int i, err;
 	const char *icc_names[] = {"qup-core", "qup-config", icc_ddr};
 
+	if (has_acpi_companion(se->dev))
+		return 0;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(se->icc_paths); i++) {
 		if (!icc_names[i])
 			continue;

drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c

@@ -1637,12 +1637,13 @@ static int acm_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
 	struct urb *urb;
 	int rv = 0;
 
-	acm_unpoison_urbs(acm);
 	spin_lock_irq(&acm->write_lock);
 
 	if (--acm->susp_count)
 		goto out;
 
+	acm_unpoison_urbs(acm);
+
 	if (tty_port_initialized(&acm->port)) {
 		rv = usb_submit_urb(acm->ctrlurb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 

drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mr.c

@@ -273,8 +273,10 @@ done:
 	mr->log_size = log_entity_size;
 	mr->nsg = nsg;
 	mr->nent = dma_map_sg_attrs(dma, mr->sg_head.sgl, mr->nsg, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL, 0);
-	if (!mr->nent)
+	if (!mr->nent) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_map;
+	}
 
 	err = create_direct_mr(mvdev, mr);
 	if (err)

drivers/vhost/vdpa.c

@@ -749,9 +749,11 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_process_iotlb_msg(struct vhost_dev *dev,
 	const struct vdpa_config_ops *ops = vdpa->config;
 	int r = 0;
 
+	mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
+
 	r = vhost_dev_check_owner(dev);
 	if (r)
-		return r;
+		goto unlock;
 
 	switch (msg->type) {
 	case VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE:
@@ -772,6 +774,8 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_process_iotlb_msg(struct vhost_dev *dev,
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	}
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
 
 	return r;
 }

include/linux/bpf.h

@@ -1259,6 +1259,11 @@ static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(void)
 	return perfmon_capable();
 }
 
+static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(void)
+{
+	return perfmon_capable();
+}
+
 static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access(void)
 {
 	return perfmon_capable();

include/linux/bpf_verifier.h

@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ struct bpf_func_state {
 	 * 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
 	 */
 	u32 frameno;
-	/* subprog number == index within subprog_stack_depth
+	/* subprog number == index within subprog_info
 	 * zero == main subprog
 	 */
 	u32 subprogno;
@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
 	u32 used_map_cnt;		/* number of used maps */
 	u32 id_gen;			/* used to generate unique reg IDs */
 	bool allow_ptr_leaks;
+	bool allow_uninit_stack;
 	bool allow_ptr_to_map_access;
 	bool bpf_capable;
 	bool bypass_spec_v1;

include/linux/platform_data/gpio-omap.h

@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
  * omap2+ specific GPIO registers
  */
 #define OMAP24XX_GPIO_REVISION		0x0000
+#define OMAP24XX_GPIO_SYSCONFIG		0x0010
 #define OMAP24XX_GPIO_IRQSTATUS1	0x0018
 #define OMAP24XX_GPIO_IRQSTATUS2	0x0028
 #define OMAP24XX_GPIO_IRQENABLE2	0x002c
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@
 #define OMAP24XX_GPIO_SETDATAOUT	0x0094
 
 #define OMAP4_GPIO_REVISION		0x0000
+#define OMAP4_GPIO_SYSCONFIG		0x0010
 #define OMAP4_GPIO_EOI			0x0020
 #define OMAP4_GPIO_IRQSTATUSRAW0	0x0024
 #define OMAP4_GPIO_IRQSTATUSRAW1	0x0028
@@ -148,6 +150,7 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
 struct omap_gpio_reg_offs {
 	u16 revision;
+	u16 sysconfig;
 	u16 direction;
 	u16 datain;
 	u16 dataout;

kernel/bpf/verifier.c

@@ -2268,12 +2268,14 @@ static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
 }
 
-/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
+/* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
  * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
  */
-static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-			     struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */
+				       /* stack frame we're writing to */
-			     int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+				       struct bpf_func_state *state,
+				       int off, int size, int value_regno,
+				       int insn_idx)
 {
 	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
 	int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
@@ -2399,9 +2401,175 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+/* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is
-			    struct bpf_func_state *reg_state /* func where register points to */,
+ * known to contain a variable offset.
-			    int off, int size, int value_regno)
+ * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively
+ * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the
+ * dynamic range is potentially written to.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'regno->off'.
+ * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to
+ * the stack.
+ *
+ * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know
+ * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for
+ * future reads cannot be terminated by this write.
+ *
+ * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered
+ * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets
+ * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to
+ * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets.
+ */
+static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				     /* func where register points to */
+				     struct bpf_func_state *state,
+				     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+				     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+{
+	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
+	int min_off, max_off;
+	int i, err;
+	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL;
+	bool writing_zero = false;
+	/* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
+	 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO
+	 */
+	bool zero_used = false;
+
+	cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+	ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno];
+	min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off;
+	max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;
+	if (value_regno >= 0)
+		value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
+	if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg))
+		writing_zero = true;
+
+	err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE),
+				 state->acquired_refs, true);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+
+	/* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
+	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
+		u8 new_type, *stype;
+		int slot, spi;
+
+		slot = -i - 1;
+		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
+		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+
+		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks
+				&& *stype != NOT_INIT
+				&& *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) {
+			/* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in
+			 * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status
+			 * would be erased below (even though not all slots are
+			 * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to
+			 * leaks.
+			 */
+			verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
+				insn_idx, i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/* Erase all spilled pointers. */
+		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
+
+		/* Update the slot type. */
+		new_type = STACK_MISC;
+		if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) {
+			new_type = STACK_ZERO;
+			zero_used = true;
+		}
+		/* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to
+		 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot
+		 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as
+		 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory.
+		 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots
+		 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject
+		 * them, the error would be too confusing.
+		 */
+		if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
+			verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d",
+					insn_idx, i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		*stype = new_type;
+	}
+	if (zero_used) {
+		/* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
+		err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off,
+ * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the
+ * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then
+ * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be
+ * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must
+ * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as
+ * read.
+ */
+static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				/* func where src register points to */
+				struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
+				int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno)
+{
+	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
+	int i, slot, spi;
+	u8 *stype;
+	int zeros = 0;
+
+	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
+		slot = -i - 1;
+		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
+		stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
+		if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO)
+			break;
+		zeros++;
+	}
+	if (zeros == max_off - min_off) {
+		/* any access_size read into register is zero extended,
+		 * so the whole register == const_zero
+		 */
+		__mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]);
+		/* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
+		 * so mark it precise here, so that later
+		 * backtracking can stop here.
+		 * Backtracking may not need this if this register
+		 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
+		 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
+		 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
+		 * backtracking. Any register that contributed
+		 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
+		 */
+		state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true;
+	} else {
+		/* have read misc data from the stack */
+		mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
+	}
+	state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+}
+
+/* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by
+ * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a
+ * spilled reg.
+ *
+ * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a
+ * register.
+ *
+ * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				      /* func where src register points to */
+				      struct bpf_func_state *reg_state,
+				      int off, int size, int dst_regno)
 {
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
@@ -2409,11 +2577,6 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
 	u8 *stype;
 
-	if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) {
-		verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+0 size %d\n",
-			off, size);
-		return -EACCES;
-	}
 	stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
 	reg = &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
 
@@ -2424,9 +2587,9 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
 				return -EACCES;
 			}
-			if (value_regno >= 0) {
+			if (dst_regno >= 0) {
-				mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
+				mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
-				state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+				state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
 			}
 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
 			return 0;
@@ -2438,16 +2601,16 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			}
 		}
 
-		if (value_regno >= 0) {
+		if (dst_regno >= 0) {
 			/* restore register state from stack */
-			state->regs[value_regno] = *reg;
+			state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
 			/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
 			 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
 			 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
 			 */
-			state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+			state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
 		} else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
-			/* If value_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
+			/* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
 			 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
 			 * (e.g. for XADD).
 			 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
@@ -2459,70 +2622,167 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		}
 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
 	} else {
-		int zeros = 0;
+		u8 type;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-			if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC)
+			type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+			if (type == STACK_MISC)
 				continue;
-			if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) {
+			if (type == STACK_ZERO)
-				zeros++;
 				continue;
-			}
 			verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
 				off, i, size);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
-		if (value_regno >= 0) {
+		if (dst_regno >= 0)
-			if (zeros == size) {
+			mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno);
-				/* any size read into register is zero extended,
-				 * so the whole register == const_zero
-				 */
-				__mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[value_regno]);
-				/* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
-				 * so mark it precise here, so that later
-				 * backtracking can stop here.
-				 * Backtracking may not need this if this register
-				 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
-				 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
-				 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
-				 * backtracking. Any register that contributed
-				 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
-				 */
-				state->regs[value_regno].precise = true;
-			} else {
-				/* have read misc data from the stack */
-				mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
-			}
-			state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
-		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+enum stack_access_src {
-			      const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+	ACCESS_DIRECT = 1,  /* the access is performed by an instruction */
-			      int off, int size)
+	ACCESS_HELPER = 2,  /* the access is performed by a helper */
+};
+
+static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+					 int regno, int off, int access_size,
+					 bool zero_size_allowed,
+					 enum stack_access_src type,
+					 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
+
+static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
 {
-	/* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
+	return cur_regs(env) + regno;
-	 * can determine what type of data were returned. See
+}
-	 * check_stack_read().
+
+/* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
+ * 'dst_regno'.
+ * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
+ * but not its variable offset.
+ * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
+ *
+ * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
+ * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
+ * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
+ * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
+ * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
+ * instead.
  */
-	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				    int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
+{
+	/* The state of the source register. */
+	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+	struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
+	int err;
+	int min_off, max_off;
+
+	/* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
+	 */
+	err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
+					    false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+	max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
+	mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
+ * check_stack_read_var_off.
+ *
+ * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
+ * bounds.
+ *
+ * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
+ * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			    int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+			    int dst_regno)
+{
+	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+	int err;
+	/* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
+	bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
+
+	/* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
+	 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
+	 * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
+	 */
+	if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
 		char tn_buf[48];
 
 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-		verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
+		verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
 			tn_buf, off, size);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
+	/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
+	 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
+	 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
+	 */
+	if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) {
+		char tn_buf[48];
 
-	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
+		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-		verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
+		verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+				ptr_regno, tn_buf);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+	if (!var_off) {
+		off += reg->var_off.value;
+		err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
+						 dst_regno);
+	} else {
+		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
+		 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
+		 * branch.
+		 */
+		err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
+					       dst_regno);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+
+/* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
+ * check_stack_write_var_off.
+ *
+ * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
+ * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
+ * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
+ * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
+ *
+ * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
+ */
+static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+			     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+{
+	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+	int err;
+
+	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+		off += reg->var_off.value;
+		err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
+						  value_regno, insn_idx);
+	} else {
+		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
+		 * than fixed offset ones.
+		 */
+		err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
+						ptr_regno, off, size,
+						value_regno, insn_idx);
+	}
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
@@ -2851,11 +3111,6 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
-{
-	return cur_regs(env) + regno;
-}
-
 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
 {
 	return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno));
@@ -2974,8 +3229,8 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		break;
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
 		pointer_desc = "stack ";
-		/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write()
+		/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
-		 * and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being
+		 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being
 		 * aligned.
 		 */
 		strict = true;
@@ -3393,6 +3648,91 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
+ * maximum valid offset is -1.
+ *
+ * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
+ * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
+ */
+static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
+					  struct bpf_func_state *state,
+					  enum bpf_access_type t)
+{
+	int min_valid_off;
+
+	if (t == BPF_WRITE)
+		min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
+	else
+		min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
+
+	if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
+		return -EACCES;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
+ * bounds.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
+ */
+static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
+		struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+		int regno, int off, int access_size,
+		enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
+{
+	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
+	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
+	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+	int min_off, max_off;
+	int err;
+	char *err_extra;
+
+	if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
+		/* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
+		err_extra = " indirect access to";
+	else if (type == BPF_READ)
+		err_extra = " read from";
+	else
+		err_extra = " write to";
+
+	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+		min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
+		if (access_size > 0)
+			max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
+		else
+			max_off = min_off;
+	} else {
+		if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
+		    reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+			verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
+				err_extra, regno);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+		if (access_size > 0)
+			max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
+		else
+			max_off = min_off;
+	}
+
+	err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
+	if (!err)
+		err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type);
+
+	if (err) {
+		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+			verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+				err_extra, regno, off, access_size);
+		} else {
+			char tn_buf[48];
+
+			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+			verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n",
+				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size);
+		}
+	}
+	return err;
+}
 
 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
  * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
@@ -3505,8 +3845,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 		}
 
 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
-		off += reg->var_off.value;
+		/* Basic bounds checks. */
-		err = check_stack_access(env, reg, off, size);
+		err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
@@ -3515,12 +3855,12 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
+		if (t == BPF_READ)
-			err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
+			err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size,
-						value_regno, insn_idx);
-		else
-			err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size,
 					       value_regno);
+		else
+			err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
+						value_regno, insn_idx);
 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
 			verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
@@ -3642,49 +3982,53 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
 				BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
 }
 
-static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+/* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
-				  int off, int access_size,
+ * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
-				  bool zero_size_allowed)
+ * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized.
-{
+ *
-	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
+ * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any).
-
+ *
-	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
+ * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the
-	    access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
+ * read offsets are marked as read.
-		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
-			verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
-				regno, off, access_size);
-		} else {
-			char tn_buf[48];
-
-			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-			verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n",
-				regno, tn_buf, access_size);
-		}
-		return -EACCES;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
- * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
- * and all elements of stack are initialized.
- * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an
- * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself.
  */
-static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
+static int check_stack_range_initialized(
+		struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
 		int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
-				struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
+		enum stack_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
 {
 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
 	int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
+	char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : "";
+	enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type;
+	/* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
+	 * read-only.
+	 */
+	bool clobber = false;
 
-	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+	if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
-		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off;
+		verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
-		err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
+		return -EACCES;
-					     zero_size_allowed);
+	}
+
+	if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) {
+		/* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for
+		 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra
+		 * checks below.
+		 */
+		bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE;
+		clobber = true;
+	} else {
+		bounds_check_type = BPF_READ;
+	}
+	err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size,
+					       type, bounds_check_type);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
+
+
+	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
 	} else {
 		/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
 		 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
@@ -3695,8 +4039,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 			char tn_buf[48];
 
 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-			verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+			verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
-				regno, tn_buf);
+				regno, err_extra, tn_buf);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
@@ -3708,28 +4052,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
 			meta = NULL;
 
-		if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
+		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
-		    reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+		max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
-			verbose(env, "R%d unbounded indirect variable offset stack access\n",
-				regno);
-			return -EACCES;
-		}
-		min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off;
-		max_off = reg->smax_value + reg->off;
-		err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
-					     zero_size_allowed);
-		if (err) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of stack bound\n",
-				regno);
-			return err;
-		}
-		err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size,
-					     zero_size_allowed);
-		if (err) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of stack bound\n",
-				regno);
-			return err;
-		}
 	}
 
 	if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
@@ -3749,8 +4073,10 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
 			goto mark;
 		if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) {
+			if (clobber) {
 				/* helper can write anything into the stack */
 				*stype = STACK_MISC;
+			}
 			goto mark;
 		}
 
@@ -3759,23 +4085,26 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 			goto mark;
 
 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
-		    state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
+		    (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
+		     env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
+			if (clobber) {
 				__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
 				for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
 					state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC;
+			}
 			goto mark;
 		}
 
 err:
 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
-			verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
-				min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
+				err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
 		} else {
 			char tn_buf[48];
 
 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-			verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
+			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
-				tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
+				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
 		}
 		return -EACCES;
 mark:
@@ -3824,8 +4153,10 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 					   "rdwr",
 					   &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access);
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
-		return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
+		return check_stack_range_initialized(
-					    zero_size_allowed, meta);
+				env,
+				regno, reg->off, access_size,
+				zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
 	default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */
 		/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
 		if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
@@ -5343,7 +5674,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
 			    (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
-	u32 off, max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
+	u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
 
 	if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
 	    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
@@ -5352,26 +5683,18 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
 		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
-		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
+		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
+		 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
+		 * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
 		 */
 		max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
-		/* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
+		ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
-		 * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
-		 */
-		off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
-		if (mask_to_left)
-			ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
-		else
-			ptr_limit = -off - 1;
 		break;
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 		max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
-		if (mask_to_left) {
+		ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
-			ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
+			     ptr_reg->smin_value :
-		} else {
+			     ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
-			off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
-			ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
-		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		return REASON_TYPE;
@@ -5426,10 +5749,12 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
-			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
+			    struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux,
+			    const bool commit_window)
 {
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
-	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
 	bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
@@ -5448,18 +5773,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	if (vstate->speculative)
 		goto do_sim;
 
-	alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
-	alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
-		     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
-
 	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
+	if (commit_window) {
+		/* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
+		 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
+		 */
+		alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state;
+		alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
+	} else {
+		alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+		alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
+			     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
+	}
+
 	err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 do_sim:
+	/* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
+	 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
+	 * stack.
+	 */
+	if (commit_window)
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
 	 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
 	 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
@@ -5518,6 +5858,72 @@ static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+/* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't
+ * have a variable offset.
+ *
+ * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it
+ * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU.  See also
+ * retrieve_ptr_limit().
+ *
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'reg->off'.
+ */
+static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
+				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				int regno,
+				const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+				int off)
+{
+	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+		char tn_buf[48];
+
+		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+		verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n",
+			regno, tn_buf, off);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
+		verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+			"prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+				 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+
+	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+	 */
+	if (env->bypass_spec_v1)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (dst_reg->type) {
+	case PTR_TO_STACK:
+		if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg,
+					dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value))
+			return -EACCES;
+		break;
+	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+		if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
+				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
  * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
  * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -5536,6 +5942,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	    smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
 	u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
 	    umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {};
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
 	int ret;
@@ -5602,12 +6009,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	/* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
 
-	switch (opcode) {
+	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
-	case BPF_ADD:
+		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
-		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
+				       &tmp_aux, false);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+	}
 
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case BPF_ADD:
 		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
 		 * the s32 'off' field
 		 */
@@ -5658,10 +6068,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		}
 		break;
 	case BPF_SUB:
-		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
-
 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
 			verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
@@ -5742,22 +6148,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
 
-	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+	if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
-	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
-	 */
-	if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
-		if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
-		    check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
-				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
 		return -EACCES;
-		} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
+	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
-			   check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
-					      dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
+				       &tmp_aux, true);
-			verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+		if (ret < 0)
-				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
-			return -EACCES;
-		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -11951,6 +12348,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 		env->strict_alignment = false;
 
 	env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
+	env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
 	env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access();
 	env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
 	env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();

kernel/locking/qrwlock.c

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(queued_read_lock_slowpath);
  */
 void queued_write_lock_slowpath(struct qrwlock *lock)
 {
+	int cnts;
+
 	/* Put the writer into the wait queue */
 	arch_spin_lock(&lock->wait_lock);
 
@@ -74,9 +76,8 @@ void queued_write_lock_slowpath(struct qrwlock *lock)
 
 	/* When no more readers or writers, set the locked flag */
 	do {
-		atomic_cond_read_acquire(&lock->cnts, VAL == _QW_WAITING);
+		cnts = atomic_cond_read_relaxed(&lock->cnts, VAL == _QW_WAITING);
-	} while (atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(&lock->cnts, _QW_WAITING,
+	} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire(&lock->cnts, &cnts, _QW_LOCKED));
-					_QW_LOCKED) != _QW_WAITING);
 unlock:
 	arch_spin_unlock(&lock->wait_lock);
 }

scripts/Makefile.kasan

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin
 KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ?= $(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
 
+cc-param = $(call cc-option, -mllvm -$(1), $(call cc-option, --param $(1)))
+
 ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
 	stack_enable := 1
 else
@@ -18,8 +20,6 @@ endif
 
 CFLAGS_KASAN_MINIMAL := -fsanitize=kernel-address
 
-cc-param = $(call cc-option, -mllvm -$(1), $(call cc-option, --param $(1)))
-
 # -fasan-shadow-offset fails without -fsanitize
 CFLAGS_KASAN_SHADOW := $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address \
 			-fasan-shadow-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET), \
@@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ endif # CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
 
 ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
-    instrumentation_flags := -mllvm -hwasan-mapping-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+    instrumentation_flags := $(call cc-param,hwasan-mapping-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET))
 else
-    instrumentation_flags := -mllvm -hwasan-instrument-with-calls=1
+    instrumentation_flags := $(call cc-param,hwasan-instrument-with-calls=1)
 endif
 
 CFLAGS_KASAN := -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress \
-		-mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(stack_enable) \
+		$(call cc-param,hwasan-instrument-stack=$(stack_enable)) \
-		-mllvm -hwasan-use-short-granules=0 \
+		$(call cc-param,hwasan-use-short-granules=0) \
 		$(instrumentation_flags)
 
 endif # CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS

security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 

tools/arch/ia64/include/asm/barrier.h

@@ -39,9 +39,6 @@
  * sequential memory pages only.
  */
 
-/* XXX From arch/ia64/include/uapi/asm/gcc_intrin.h */
-#define ia64_mf()       asm volatile ("mf" ::: "memory")
-
 #define mb()		ia64_mf()
 #define rmb()		mb()
 #define wmb()		mb()

tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c

@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int auxtrace_parse_snapshot_options(struct auxtrace_record *itr,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (itr)
+	if (itr && itr->parse_snapshot_options)
 		return itr->parse_snapshot_options(itr, opts, str);
 
 	pr_err("No AUX area tracing to snapshot\n");

tools/perf/util/map.c

@@ -836,15 +836,18 @@ out:
 int maps__clone(struct thread *thread, struct maps *parent)
 {
 	struct maps *maps = thread->maps;
-	int err = -ENOMEM;
+	int err;
 	struct map *map;
 
 	down_read(&parent->lock);
 
 	maps__for_each_entry(parent, map) {
 		struct map *new = map__clone(map);
-		if (new == NULL)
+
+		if (new == NULL) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out_unlock;
+		}
 
 		err = unwind__prepare_access(maps, new, NULL);
 		if (err)