Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

  IMA:
   - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules

  KEYS:
   - add a system blacklist keyring

   - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
     functionality to userland via keyctl()

  LSM:
   - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init

   - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux

   - revive security_task_alloc hook

  TPM:
   - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
  tpm: Fix reference count to main device
  tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
  tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
  tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
  keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
  apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
  apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
  apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
  apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
  security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
  apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
  Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
  smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
  KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
  KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
  KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
  KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
  KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
  KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2017-05-03 08:50:52 -07:00
95 changed files with 3243 additions and 1123 deletions

View File

@@ -295,6 +295,13 @@ struct compat_old_sigaction {
};
#endif
struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params {
compat_uptr_t hashname;
compat_uptr_t otherinfo;
__u32 otherinfolen;
__u32 __spare[8];
};
struct compat_statfs;
struct compat_statfs64;
struct compat_old_linux_dirent;

View File

@@ -219,6 +219,12 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;
# define INIT_TASK_TI(tsk)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
#define INIT_TASK_SECURITY .security = NULL,
#else
#define INIT_TASK_SECURITY
#endif
/*
* INIT_TASK is used to set up the first task table, touch at
* your own risk!. Base=0, limit=0x1fffff (=2MB)
@@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;
INIT_NUMA_BALANCING(tsk) \
INIT_KASAN(tsk) \
INIT_LIVEPATCH(tsk) \
INIT_TASK_SECURITY \
}

View File

@@ -147,6 +147,14 @@ struct key_type {
*/
request_key_actor_t request_key;
/* Look up a keyring access restriction (optional)
*
* - NULL is a valid return value (meaning the requested restriction
* is known but will never block addition of a key)
* - should return -EINVAL if the restriction is unknown
*/
struct key_restriction *(*lookup_restriction)(const char *params);
/* internal fields */
struct list_head link; /* link in types list */
struct lock_class_key lock_class; /* key->sem lock class */

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -126,6 +127,17 @@ static inline bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref)
return (unsigned long) key_ref & 1UL;
}
typedef int (*key_restrict_link_func_t)(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload,
struct key *restriction_key);
struct key_restriction {
key_restrict_link_func_t check;
struct key *key;
struct key_type *keytype;
};
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* authentication token / access credential / keyring
@@ -135,7 +147,7 @@ static inline bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref)
* - Kerberos TGTs and tickets
*/
struct key {
atomic_t usage; /* number of references */
refcount_t usage; /* number of references */
key_serial_t serial; /* key serial number */
union {
struct list_head graveyard_link;
@@ -205,18 +217,17 @@ struct key {
};
/* This is set on a keyring to restrict the addition of a link to a key
* to it. If this method isn't provided then it is assumed that the
* to it. If this structure isn't provided then it is assumed that the
* keyring is open to any addition. It is ignored for non-keyring
* keys.
* keys. Only set this value using keyring_restrict(), keyring_alloc(),
* or key_alloc().
*
* This is intended for use with rings of trusted keys whereby addition
* to the keyring needs to be controlled. KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION
* overrides this, allowing the kernel to add extra keys without
* restriction.
*/
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload);
struct key_restriction *restrict_link;
};
extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
@@ -225,9 +236,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags,
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
const struct key_type *,
const union key_payload *));
struct key_restriction *restrict_link);
#define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
@@ -242,7 +251,7 @@ extern void key_put(struct key *key);
static inline struct key *__key_get(struct key *key)
{
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
refcount_inc(&key->usage);
return key;
}
@@ -303,14 +312,13 @@ extern struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid
const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags,
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
const struct key_type *,
const union key_payload *),
struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
struct key *dest);
extern int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload);
const union key_payload *payload,
struct key *restriction_key);
extern int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring);
@@ -321,6 +329,9 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
extern int keyring_add_key(struct key *keyring,
struct key *key);
extern int keyring_restrict(key_ref_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction);
extern struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id);
static inline key_serial_t key_serial(const struct key *key)

View File

@@ -533,8 +533,13 @@
* manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
* @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_alloc:
* @task task being allocated.
* @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
* Handle allocation of task-related resources.
* Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
* @task_free:
* @task task being freed
* @task task about to be freed.
* Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
* from interrupt context.)
* @cred_alloc_blank:
@@ -630,10 +635,19 @@
* Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
* @p contains the task_struct of process.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_prlimit:
* Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of
* another task.
* @cred points to the cred structure for the current task.
* @tcred points to the cred structure for the target task.
* @flags contains the LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating whether the
* resource limits are being read, modified, or both.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_setrlimit:
* Check permission before setting the resource limits of the current
* process for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can
* be examined by dereferencing (current->signal->rlim + resource).
* Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p
* for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can
* be examined by dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource).
* @p points to the task_struct for the target task's group leader.
* @resource contains the resource whose limit is being set.
* @new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
@@ -1473,6 +1487,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_free)(struct cred *cred);
@@ -1494,6 +1509,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_prlimit)(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
unsigned int flags);
int (*task_setrlimit)(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim);
int (*task_setscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1737,6 +1754,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head file_receive;
struct list_head file_open;
struct list_head task_create;
struct list_head task_alloc;
struct list_head task_free;
struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;
struct list_head cred_free;
@@ -1755,6 +1773,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head task_setnice;
struct list_head task_setioprio;
struct list_head task_getioprio;
struct list_head task_prlimit;
struct list_head task_setrlimit;
struct list_head task_setscheduler;
struct list_head task_getscheduler;
@@ -1908,6 +1927,13 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
/* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
#define __lsm_ro_after_init
#else
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA

View File

@@ -1046,6 +1046,10 @@ struct task_struct {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
int patch_state;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
/* Used by LSM modules for access restriction: */
void *security;
#endif
/* CPU-specific state of this task: */
struct thread_struct thread;

View File

@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr;
/* setfsuid or setfsgid, id0 == fsuid or fsgid */
#define LSM_SETID_FS 8
/* Flags for security_task_prlimit(). */
#define LSM_PRLIMIT_READ 1
#define LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE 2
/* forward declares to avoid warnings */
struct sched_param;
struct request_sock;
@@ -304,6 +308,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
@@ -324,6 +329,8 @@ void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
unsigned int flags);
int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim);
int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -855,6 +862,12 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
return 0;
}
static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{ }
@@ -949,6 +962,13 @@ static inline int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
static inline int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred,
const struct cred *tcred,
unsigned int flags)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p,
unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim)

View File

@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ struct tpm_class_ops {
u8 (*status) (struct tpm_chip *chip);
bool (*update_timeouts)(struct tpm_chip *chip,
unsigned long *timeout_cap);
int (*request_locality)(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc);
void (*relinquish_locality)(struct tpm_chip *chip, int loc);
};
#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)