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- // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
- /* -*- linux-c -*-
- * sysctl_net.c: sysctl interface to net subsystem.
- *
- * Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver.
- * Added /proc/sys/net directories for each protocol family. [MS]
- *
- * Revision 1.2 1996/05/08 20:24:40 shaver
- * Added bits for NET_BRIDGE and the NET_IPV4_ARP stuff and
- * NET_IPV4_IP_FORWARD.
- *
- *
- */
- #include <linux/mm.h>
- #include <linux/export.h>
- #include <linux/sysctl.h>
- #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
- #include <net/sock.h>
- #ifdef CONFIG_INET
- #include <net/ip.h>
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_NET
- #include <linux/if_ether.h>
- #endif
- static struct ctl_table_set *
- net_ctl_header_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root)
- {
- return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls;
- }
- static int is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set)
- {
- return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls == set;
- }
- /* Return standard mode bits for table entry. */
- static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
- struct ctl_table *table)
- {
- struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
- /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */
- if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
- int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7;
- return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
- }
- return table->mode;
- }
- static void net_ctl_set_ownership(struct ctl_table_header *head,
- struct ctl_table *table,
- kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid)
- {
- struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
- kuid_t ns_root_uid;
- kgid_t ns_root_gid;
- ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
- if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid))
- *uid = ns_root_uid;
- ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
- if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid))
- *gid = ns_root_gid;
- }
- static struct ctl_table_root net_sysctl_root = {
- .lookup = net_ctl_header_lookup,
- .permissions = net_ctl_permissions,
- .set_ownership = net_ctl_set_ownership,
- };
- static int __net_init sysctl_net_init(struct net *net)
- {
- setup_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls, &net_sysctl_root, is_seen);
- return 0;
- }
- static void __net_exit sysctl_net_exit(struct net *net)
- {
- retire_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls);
- }
- static struct pernet_operations sysctl_pernet_ops = {
- .init = sysctl_net_init,
- .exit = sysctl_net_exit,
- };
- static struct ctl_table_header *net_header;
- __init int net_sysctl_init(void)
- {
- static struct ctl_table empty[1];
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
- /* Avoid limitations in the sysctl implementation by
- * registering "/proc/sys/net" as an empty directory not in a
- * network namespace.
- */
- net_header = register_sysctl("net", empty);
- if (!net_header)
- goto out;
- ret = register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_pernet_ops);
- if (ret)
- goto out1;
- out:
- return ret;
- out1:
- unregister_sysctl_table(net_header);
- net_header = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- /* Verify that sysctls for non-init netns are safe by either:
- * 1) being read-only, or
- * 2) having a data pointer which points outside of the global kernel/module
- * data segment, and rather into the heap where a per-net object was
- * allocated.
- */
- static void ensure_safe_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path,
- struct ctl_table *table)
- {
- struct ctl_table *ent;
- pr_debug("Registering net sysctl (net %p): %s\n", net, path);
- for (ent = table; ent->procname; ent++) {
- unsigned long addr;
- const char *where;
- pr_debug(" procname=%s mode=%o proc_handler=%ps data=%p\n",
- ent->procname, ent->mode, ent->proc_handler, ent->data);
- /* If it's not writable inside the netns, then it can't hurt. */
- if ((ent->mode & 0222) == 0) {
- pr_debug(" Not writable by anyone\n");
- continue;
- }
- /* Where does data point? */
- addr = (unsigned long)ent->data;
- if (is_module_address(addr))
- where = "module";
- else if (is_kernel_core_data(addr))
- where = "kernel";
- else
- continue;
- /* If it is writable and points to kernel/module global
- * data, then it's probably a netns leak.
- */
- WARN(1, "sysctl %s/%s: data points to %s global data: %ps\n",
- path, ent->procname, where, ent->data);
- /* Make it "safe" by dropping writable perms */
- ent->mode &= ~0222;
- }
- }
- struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl(struct net *net,
- const char *path, struct ctl_table *table)
- {
- if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
- ensure_safe_net_sysctl(net, path, table);
- return __register_sysctl_table(&net->sysctls, path, table);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_net_sysctl);
- void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header)
- {
- unregister_sysctl_table(header);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_net_sysctl_table);
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