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- What: /sys/kernel/security/*/ima/policy
- Date: May 2008
- Contact: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
- Description:
- The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
- Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
- values of executables and other sensitive system files
- loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime,
- the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data.
- Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy
- by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and
- then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after
- the file ima/policy is closed.
- IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements
- for local measurement appraisal.
- ::
- rule format: action [condition ...]
- action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise |
- audit | hash | dont_hash
- condition:= base | lsm [option]
- base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [fsname=]
- [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
- [fowner=] [fgroup=]]
- lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
- option: [digest_type=] [template=] [permit_directio]
- [appraise_type=] [appraise_flag=]
- [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
- base:
- func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
- [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
- [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
- [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
- [SETXATTR_CHECK]
- mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
- [[^]MAY_EXEC]
- fsmagic:= hex value
- fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
- uid:= decimal value
- euid:= decimal value
- gid:= decimal value
- egid:= decimal value
- fowner:= decimal value
- fgroup:= decimal value
- lsm: are LSM specific
- option:
- appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
- where 'imasig' is the original or the signature
- format v2.
- where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
- where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. (Currently
- limited to fsverity digest based signatures
- stored in security.ima xattr. Requires
- specifying "digest_type=verity" first.)
- appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist]
- Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended
- signature.
- digest_type:= verity
- Require fs-verity's file digest instead of the
- regular IMA file hash.
- keyrings:= list of keyrings
- (eg, .builtin_trusted_keys|.ima). Only valid
- when action is "measure" and func is KEY_CHECK.
- template:= name of a defined IMA template type
- (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
- pcr:= decimal value
- label:= [selinux]|[kernel_info]|[data_label]
- data_label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
- For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux.
- appraise_algos:= comma-separated list of hash algorithms
- For example, "sha256,sha512" to only accept to appraise
- files where the security.ima xattr was hashed with one
- of these two algorithms.
- default policy:
- # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
- # SYSFS_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
- # DEBUGFS_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
- # TMPFS_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
- # RAMFS_MAGIC
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
- # DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
- # BINFMTFS_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
- # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
- # SELINUX_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
- # CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
- # NSFS_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
- measure func=BPRM_CHECK
- measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
- measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
- measure func=MODULE_CHECK
- measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
- appraise fowner=0
- The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
- all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
- open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal
- policy appraises all files owned by root.
- Examples of LSM specific definitions:
- SELinux::
- dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
- dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
- dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
- dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t
- measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
- measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
- Smack::
- measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
- Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
- measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
- measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5
- Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures:
- appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
- Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to measure all keys:
- measure func=KEY_CHECK
- Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to only measure
- keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring:
- measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima
- Example of the special SETXATTR_CHECK appraise rule, that
- restricts the hash algorithms allowed when writing to the
- security.ima xattr of a file:
- appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512
- Example of a 'measure' rule requiring fs-verity's digests
- with indication of type of digest in the measurement list.
- measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity \
- template=ima-ngv2
- Example of 'measure' and 'appraise' rules requiring fs-verity
- signatures (format version 3) stored in security.ima xattr.
- The 'measure' rule specifies the 'ima-sigv3' template option,
- which includes the indication of type of digest and the file
- signature in the measurement list.
- measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
- template=ima-sigv3
- The 'appraise' rule specifies the type and signature format
- version (sigv3) required.
- appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
- appraise_type=sigv3
- All of these policy rules could, for example, be constrained
- either based on a filesystem's UUID (fsuuid) or based on LSM
- labels.
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